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ABSTRACT 
Market Power in Outputs and Inputs:  An Empirical Application to Banking 
by Robert M. Adams*, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Robin C. Sickles 
This paper provides evidence on the empirical separability of input and output market 
imperfections. We specify a model of banking competition and simultaneously estimate 
bank conduct in output (loan) and input (deposit) markets. Our results suggest that firms 
display some degree of noncompetitive behavior in both the loan and the deposit 
markets. Moreover, we find that the input side and the output side are empirically 
separable, that is the measurement of market power on one side of the market is not 
affected by assuming that the other side of the market is perfectly competitive. Our 
results suggest that empirical studies of market power that concentrate on either the 
input side or the output side, are not subject to significant misspecification error. 
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JEL Classification: G2, L1, C3 
                                                 
*  The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Board of Governors, or its staff. We wish to thank Charles Taragin 
for his excellent research assistance and Alex Raskovich, Beth Kiser, Robin Prager, Ken Brevoort, 
Ron Borzekowski, and Dean Amel for their comments. We are grateful to the German Science 
Foundation (DFG) for financial support. 
iii 
 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Marktmacht auf Input- und Outputmärkten: Eine Empirische Anwendung auf 
den Bankensektor 
Der Aufsatz untersucht den Zusammenhang von Unvollkommenheiten auf Input- und 
auf Outputmärkten.  Im Rahmen eines Wettbewerbsmodells für den Bankensektor wird 
die Wechselwirkung zwischen Outputmarkt, d.h. bei der Kreditvergabe, und Inputmarkt 
(Geldanlage) empirisch untersucht. 
 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Banken auf beiden Seiten des Marktes eine gewisse 
Marktmacht ausüben können.  Allerdings ist die Wechselwirkung begrenzt, sodass eine 
separate Betrachtungsweise von Input- und Outputmärkten möglich ist.  Dies bedeutet 
wiederum, dass empirische Untersuchungen, die jeweils nur eine Seite des Marktes 
analysieren, keinen signifikanten Verzerrungen unterliegen. 
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1 Introduction
Most empirical studies on the measurement of market power in output mar-
kets assume that input markets are perfectly competitive. However, there
are many industries where this assumption may not be valid. In fact, it has
been argued that firms with market power are able to extract considerable
rents from both input and output markets. In this context, it is important
to understand to what extent the measurement of market power in output
markets is aﬀected by the assumption of perfectly competitive input mar-
kets. This paper provides evidence on the empirical separability of input
and output markets.
In order to investigate the relationship between input and output market
imperfections, one needs a model and an industry where input and output
markets are prominent. The industry that we investigate in this paper is
banking. Banking competition has been a topic of considerable interest,
especially since the early 1980s, when deposit rates were deregulated and
banks were permitted to pay interest on demand deposits. The banking
industry clearly is going through substantial changes in structure and com-
petition. Mergers, failures and entry have resulted in a net decline in the
number of banks from some 14,500 in 1980 to around 8,200 in 2000. These
changes in the banking industry’s structure and competitive environment
have fueled a large literature on banking competition.
We specify a model of banking competition, where banks have market
power in loan markets (the output market), as well as in deposit markets (i.e.
the input market). More specifically, we diﬀerentiate between three diﬀerent
loan categories: commercial and industrial loans, installment loans, and real
estate loans. Given that consumers are typically not able to substitute one
loan type for another it is likely that each of these loan types constitutes a
separate output market.1
We implement our model with quarterly state level data from the U.S.
commercial banking industry from 1987 through 1996. We find that firms
display some degree of non-competitive behavior in both the loan and deposit
markets. In particular, there is evidence that, in both markets, prices are
higher than a non-cooperative Nash outcome would predict.
Given that our empirical model accounts for market imperfections on
both the input side (deposit) as well as the output side (loan) we then
compare our results to a situation where either the input or the output side
1Of course, common cost elements exist between the markets such as the costs of federal
funds and discount funds, but it is the demand side and risk that diﬀer dramatically in
these markets.
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is assumed to be perfectly competitive. In other words, we provide some
evidence on whether it matters for the measurement of product market
imperfections that the input market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Our main result is as follows. We find that the input side and the output
side are empirically separable; that is, the measurement of market power on
one side of the market is not aﬀected by the assuming that the other side
of the market is perfectly competitive. This is true independent of whether
the output market is aggregated or not. Our results suggest that empirical
studies of market power that concentrate on either the input side or the
output side are not subject to a significant misspecification error.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following manner. Sec-
tion 2 provides background information. In section 3, we introduce our
model of banking competition and discuss the empirical implementation in
section 4. The data are described in section 5 and the results in section 6.
We conclude in section 7.
2 Background
Quantifying market behavior and productivity in the banking industry is
still an elusive topic primarily because the appropriate data are not avail-
able. In addition, diﬃculties exist in defining inputs and outputs and in
measuring prices. Because of these diﬃculties, a substantial part of bank
competition research has centered on the structure-conduct-performance
(SCP) relationship and, until recently, the eﬃcient-structure (ES) hypoth-
esis.2 The structure-conduct-performance hypothesis posits higher profits
in more concentrated markets from the exercise of market power. Con-
versely, the eﬃcient-structure hypothesis3 gives a diﬀerent explanation by
attributing higher profits and market concentration to greater firm eﬃciency.
Authors typically consider the eﬀect of market concentration on prices or
profitability. Market concentration in banking is typically measured in terms
of total deposits.4 Most studies use a measure of price such as deposit in-
terest rates or a measure of profitability such as return on assets or return
on equity in their analysis.
Numerous studies of banking competition use the market concentration
methodology. Gilbert (1984) surveys the previous literature on banking
2See Berger and Hannan (1989) for SCP and Berger and Hannan (1995, 1998) for ES.
3See Demsetz (1973).
4The Federal Reserve and Department of Justice Antitrust Division use market con-
centration measured by deposits using FDIC data.
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competition spanning two decades and finds a positive relationship between
market share and performance.5 Berger and Hannan (1989) examine the
relationship between concentration and deposit interest rates after deregu-
lation in the 1980s. They find lower deposit rates in higher concentrated
markets. In a subsequent study, Hannan and Berger (1991) find asymmetric
adjustment of deposit rates to Treasury Bill rates in concentrated markets,
where banks in more concentrated markets decrease deposit rates in peri-
ods of declining overall rates more quickly than they increase them during
periods of increasing interest rates. Hannan (1991, 1997) links local market
concentration to higher rates on diﬀerent classes of small commercial loans.
Furthermore, other studies support the hypothesis that concentration leads
to less eﬃcient firms, which implies that firms with market power are not
profit maximizing. Berger and Hannan (1997, 1998) test both the market
power and eﬃciency hypotheses in U.S. banking. These studies find support
for the hypothesis that market concentration is associated with lower bank
eﬃciency, a contradiction of the eﬃcient-structure hypothesis.
Banking market concentration studies lend themselves to competition
analysis for several reasons. First, deposit data (by branch on a yearly ba-
sis) are readily available and can be used easily to determine market share
for a relatively small geographic market. Second, Federal Reserve (Fed) and
Department of Justice (DOJ) antitrust merger analysis uses Herfindahl—
Hirschman Index (HHI) market concentration measures6 derived from de-
posit shares as an initial screen to determine the possible eﬀects of a bank
merger.7 Threshold values of the HHI that warrant competitive concern
include a HHI level of 1800 and a change in HHI of 200. Once both of these
bounds are exceeded, the Fed and DOJ consider other factors such as po-
tential entry and market growth to determine if action is necessary. Because
merger analysis relies on HHI measures of concentration, it is important to
understand the relationship between prices and concentration in order to
draw inferences about competition. Hence, studies that examine this rela-
5Not all studies listed in this survey reach this conclusion.
6The HHI is defined as the sum of squared market shares. Market shares are typically
derived from deposits, because it is assumed that the level of a bank’s deposits in a market
is an indication of the level of its other banking services in that same market.
7There are some diﬀerences between the Federal Reserve and DOJ methods. First,
DOJ only includes thrifts in its market share calculations under certain conditions, while
the Fed typically includes them at 50%. Second, geographic market definitions diﬀer. The
Federal Reserve tends to use economically integrated areas such as MSAs or RMAs to
determine geographic markets, while the DOJ defines markets on other criteria such as
small business service areas. Third, the Fed considers the product market to be a bundle
of banking services, while the DOJ analyzes individual products.
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tionship are directly relevant to competition policy. Furthermore, deposit
shares are essentially used as a proxy for other types of banking services
such as loans, cash management, underwriting, etc. Since loan data are not
readily available at a branch level, both agencies rely on deposit data for
their competitive analysis.8
Past studies9 on market structure in the banking industry attempted to
determine the relationship between market concentration and prices. How-
ever, this methodology is unable to estimate the degree of competition in
the industry. Other authors have introduced structural models of banking
competition using the methods outlined in Bresnahan (1989) that can de-
termine the degree of competition in an industry. These methods have been
applied to the banking industry by Shaﬀer (1989, 1993), Shaﬀer and DiSalvo
(1994), Suominen (1994), and Neven and Röller (1999). Most studies, par-
ticularly those using U.S. data, have found little evidence of market power.
Suominen (1994) estimates the competitive behavior for two separate mar-
kets, aggregated loan and deposit markets. His study finds mixed results on
the market behavior of Finnish banks, where banks behave competitively
before regulation in 1984 and less after deregulation. Shaﬀer (1993) consid-
ers competition in the Canadian banking industry using total assets as an
output index and finds an equilibrium consistent with perfect competition.
Neven and Röller (1999) find significant monopoly collusive behavior in Eu-
ropean banking markets, where they consider corporate and household loan
markets. Finally, Shaﬀer (1989) estimates a model with aggregated loans
and finds firm behavior in the U.S. banking industry is more consistent with
a competitive equilibrium than non-cooperative Nash behavior. Shaﬀer and
DiSalvo (1994) find imperfectly competitive behavior in a highly concen-
trated duopoly banking market.10 Almost all of these studies aggregate
loan outputs into a single index. Since loan markets are very heterogeneous
in nature, this aggregation could complicate any inference on competition
in the banking industry.
Aggregation is also important because of its implications for merger pol-
icy. Two distinct methods of analysis in banking markets are applied by the
Fed and the DOJ. On the one hand, the Fed uses a cluster market approach,
8The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) data contain detailed loan information.
One significant shortcoming of these data is their complete lack of price information.
Also, they do not cover all banks - only large or metropolitan banks are included.
9See Gilbert (1984), Berger and Hannan (1989), Hannan (1991, 1997).
10Their measure of market behavior lies between perfect competition and non-
cooperative Nash equilibria.
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where banking services are considered jointly as a cluster of products.11 Un-
der this methodology, all retail banking products are bundled together, since
consumers are alleged to purchase several services, such as loans, deposits,
and other retail services, from a single bank. Furthermore, banking markets
are defined to be geographically large, and often include other financial insti-
tutions such as thrifts because of their provision of many bank services. On
the other hand, the DOJ applies the smallest-market principle detailed in the
Merger Guidelines promulgated by the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). In the smallest-market principle, a product market is defined as the
set of products for which a hypothetical monopolist (i.e. all the firms which
produce a specific product in a specific area would hypothetically act as a
single monopolist) could impose a “small but significant and non-transitory”
price increase.12 The resulting analysis centers on separate loan and deposit
markets. Small business and middle market lending are typically individual
markets of concern in DOJ analyses. Other financial institutions are in-
cluded in the analysis only if they represent a significant competitor in the
individual markets. Our model allows us to consider competition in separate
markets following the single market principle of the DOJ.
3 Model
We use a static Cournot game to develop a structural model of oligopoly
behavior.13 We assume profit maximization, where banks sell loans to con-
sumers and borrow loanable funds from depositors. It is well known that
deposits could also represent other banking retail services (an output) to
customers. However, our aim is to determine whether banks are paying
competitive rates for deposits. In order to measure monopsony power, we
model savings deposits as inputs.
11The Federal Reserve often cites a 1963 Supreme Court decision, which defines the clus-
ter of banking services as the product market in banking. See United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963).
12See Merger Guidelines (1997) pg. 4.
13A Bertrand equilibrium may be a more appropriate model in the banking industry.
However, the theoretical value of the market parameter in a non-cooperative Nash outcome
tends to be lower in a Bertrand equilibrium than in a Cournot equilibrium. This means
that Bertrand competitors act as though there were fewer firms in the market than Cournot
competitors. Hence, estimates using Cournot equilibrium are still indicative of overall
market behavior and tend to understate the level of collusion in a market. Also, the
reader should note that this study does not consider any dynamics in competition, but
only considers average firm behavior over the entire sample.
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We start our formulation of the model by specifying the aggregate de-
mand equation for loan type j:
rlj = P
l
j(Lj , Zl) (1)
where rlj is the interest rate charged on loan j, Lj is the market level quantity
of loan j, and Zl represents exogenous demand determinants. Customers also
supply loanable funds to banks:
rdi = P
d
i (Di, Zd) (2)
where rdi is the price of deposit i, Di is the market level quantity of deposits,
and Zd represents exogenous demand determinants. Given loan demand and
deposit supply, we consider a representative bank n that produces loan types
j = 1, 2, 3 and demands deposits i = 1, 2 to maximize profits, where loan
types are real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, and installment
loans and deposit types are savings deposits and purchased funds:14
max
di,lj
Π =
3X
j=1
rljlj −
2X
j=1
rdi di − C
³
{lj}3j=1, {di}2i=1
´
,
s.t. rlj = P
l
j(Lj , Zl),
rd = P di (Di, Zd) and
3X
j=1
lj ≤
2X
i=1
di
where rlj is the price for loan type j, lj is the dollar value of loans for loan
type j for bank n, di is the dollar value of deposits for deposit type i for
bank b, rdi is the price of deposit type i, and C(.) is the management
cost function, where costs are a function of the loan and deposit quantities.
Given loan demand, deposit supply, and cost specifications, we can write
the first order conditions for the Cournot solution, where banks are oﬀering
loans on the one hand and demanding deposits on the other and banks have
possible market power in deposit market i, assuming competitive market
behavior in other deposit markets. We use purchased funds (d1) as the
14Purchased funds represent an aggregation of other forms of non-core deposits. We do
not include any equity requirements, because they would have no eﬀect on the first order
conditions of the model.
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competitive deposit market.15 Purchased funds are described in the data
section. Substituting in d1 =
P3
j=1 lj − d2, we get the following first order
conditions:
rlj − rd1 +
∂rlj
∂Lj
ljθj − MClj = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3 (3)
−rd2 + rd1 −
∂rd2
∂D2
d2λ2 − MCd2 = 0 (4)
whereMClj andMCdi are marginal management costs with respect to loan
j and deposit i, and θj and λi measure the degree of competition. These
parameters measure the degree to which market interest rates are set above
marginal costs or above (below) perfectly competitive levels. In output mar-
kets at the firm level, if θj = 0, price equals marginal cost and the industry
is perfectly competitive, while θj = 1 is consistent with Cournot Nash be-
havior. Collusive (or monopoly) behavior occurs when θj = N . In factor
markets, when λi = 0, factor price equals marginal revenue product (less
marginal costs) and the factor market is perfectly competitive. When λi = 1,
we observe Cournot Nash behavior. Collusive (or monopsony) behavior is
observed when λi = N , indicating that factor prices are less than marginal
revenue product.
In a perfectly competitive equilibrium, banks set the intermediation mar-
gin (i.e., rlj − rd1) equal to their marginal managerial costs. Since both rates
are pegged to the perfectly competitive market and costs are separable, this
implies that rates in loan markets are independent from rates in deposit mar-
kets (Freixas and Rochet, 1997).16 It is important to note, however, that
even though loan demands are not interrelated, where changes in quantity
of one loan type do not aﬀect prices in other loan types, we still consider
a multimarket model since markets are connected through the management
cost function.
15 In the estimation of the market behavior parameters, we account for interest rate risk
by using term equivalent interest rates. For real estate loans, 10 year bond rates are used,
and, for commercial and industrial loans and installment loans, we use 5 year bond yields.
16There has been some discussion in the literature about which market should repre-
sent the perfectly competitive market. We do not address that issue in this paper. See
Santomero (1984) for a more detail discussion.
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4 Empirical Implementation
In order to simplify estimation, we consider an average bank within a state
by aggregating the data to the state level17 (i.e. by summing the first order
conditions (equations 3 and 4) over firms) and dividing by N (the number of
banks in a state in a given quarter). While this aggregation detracts from
any analysis of firm specific behavior, it lends itself to an analysis of over-
all industry behavior. Ostensibly, we are estimating average firm behavior
across the U.S. Aggregation leads to the following first order conditions:
rlj − rd1 +
∂rlj
∂Lj
Ljθj − MC(Lj/N) = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3 (5)
−rd2 + rd1 −
∂rd2
∂D2
D2λ − MC(D2/N) = 0 (6)
In this case, the behavioral parameters θj and λ have been redefined as
a result of the aggregation, where θj =
δj
N and λ =
δ
N , where δj and δ
are the aggregate estimated parameters. A value of 0 is still consistent with
perfect competition, but Cournot behavior is observed when θj and λ = 1N ,
and perfect collusion is observed when θj and λ = 1.
In order to estimate this system of equations, we make functional form
assumptions for marginal management costs and the demand and supply
functions. We base our marginal cost functional form on a translog cost
function and calculate marginal costs at the state mean.18 We get the fol-
lowing marginal costs for loans and deposits:
MC(
Lj
N
) =
C
Ls
(α¯j + α1jNBR+ α2j lnWage+ α3j lnWcap
+
3X
s=1
γs ln(
Ls
N
)) for j, s = 1, 2, 3 (7)
MC(
D2
N
) =
C
D2
(ρ¯0 + ρ1NBR+ ρ2 lnWage+ ρ3 lnWcap
+ ρ4 ln(
D2
N
)) (8)
where C is total costs, NBR represents the number of branches, Wcap is
the average price of capital and WAGE is the average wages rate within
17We cannot aggregate to the individual market level, because we are unable to infer
any price information for individual markets within a state.
18Our results are robust to other functional form assumptions.
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each state. The variables, number of branches, price of capital, and wages,
are included in marginal cost equations to account for the costs of branch
networks to the diﬀerent loan types and deposits and for the labor costs in
each market. We also assume log-log functional forms for loan demand and
deposit supply:
ln rlj = dj0 + djt + dj1 lnLj + dj2 lnPop+ dj4 ln Income+ dj5 lnEmployment
+
4X
2
dj6tqt + dj6 lnTA+ dj7TL+ dj8NBR/N
+
50X
s=1
stjs +
9X
y=1
yrjy + ²1j for j = 1, 2, 3 (9)
ln rd2 = s0 + s1 lnD2 + s2 lnPop+ s3 ln Income+ s4 lnTA+ s5 lnTL
+ s6NBR/N +
4X
2
s4tqt +
50X
s=1
sts +
9X
y=1
yry + ²2 (10)
where Pop is the state population, employment is the number employed in
each specific state, income is state level income, qt is a quarterly dummy vari-
able, TA is total assets, TL is total loans, and stjs and yrjy are state and
year dummy variables respectively. We include state population, income,
employment, total assets, and total loans to account for shifts in loan de-
mand or deposit supply. The quarterly dummies are included to account for
seasonal variation and the year dummies are included to account for demand
shifts over time. The results section discusses the necessity of including the
state dummy variables in the demand equations.
The behavioral questions that follow from the functional form assump-
tions are:19
rlj − rd1 + rljδj/N −
C
Lj
(α¯ji + α1jNBR+ α2j lnWage
+ α3j lnWacp+
3X
s=1
γsj ln(Ls/N)) + ²3j = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3(11)
−rd2 + rd1 − s2rd2δ/N −
C
D2
(ρ¯0 + ρ1NBR+ ρ2 lnWage
19While our model does not directly account for risk, the large diﬀerences in our marginal
cost estimates across loan types are an indication that our marginal costs reflect some of
the risk within each loan type.
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+ ρ3 lnWcap+ ρ4 ln(D2/N)) + ²4 = 0 (12)
where γj , γsj , ρi, and ρsi are parameters from a translog cost function
specification and where ²3j and ²4 are additive errors. The parameters in
the four behavioral equations are estimated jointly with the loan demand
equations and the deposit supply equations.
5 Data
We construct a panel data set of U.S. commercial banks taken from the
Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) and the FDIC Summary
of Deposits. All values are aggregated to the state level and the data are
quarterly for the 10—year period from 1987 through 1996.
Prices are imputed from loan and deposit revenues, where interest and
fee income from loans in each category is divided by total loans20 in each
loan type. These imputed prices represent the average revenue of each dollar
loaned for each bank. Deposit loan prices represent the average amount paid
per dollar of deposit received.21 All dollar figures are in thousands of 1982-84
dollars. The resulting data set contains 2017 observations.
The variables in our data include: PRE Price of Real Estate Loans, PCI
Price of Commercial and Industrial Loans, P IN Price of Installment Loans,
PCD Price of Savings Deposits, PPF Price of Purchased Funds, RELN (real
estate loans), CILN (commercial and industrial loans), INLN (installment
loans), L (labor), C (capital), Purf (purchased funds),22 CD (retail time and
savings deposits) rlj = P
ci, P re, P in; rdi = P
cd.
6 Results
We jointly estimate eight equations (see equations 9 — 12) using generalized
method of moments.23 Tables (2) and (3) show the results for the demand
and supply equations and the first order equations (see demand equations 9
and 10 and behavioral equations 11 and 12).
20Net of allowance and reserves.
21Gilbert (1984) discusses some of the shortcomings of using this measure of price.
22Purchased funds include federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements
to repurchase and demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury and other borrowed money,
as well as other borrowed money and deposits which are not demand deposits and retail
time and savings deposits.
23Note that loan demand and supply equations represent 3 equations (one for each loan
market) respectively.
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Estimation proceeds by setting orthogonality conditions. Let e be the
matrix of additive error terms for the equations, where these error terms
are a function of the parameter vector and exogenous variables. Let Z be
the matrix of exogenous variables and instruments.24 The orthogonality
conditions are written as:
g =
1
N ∗ T Z
0e (13)
Parameter estimates are obtained by minimizing:
q = g0W−1g (14)
where W is the covariance matrix of the orthogonality restrictions.25. We
control for state specific heterogeneity in the loan demand and deposit sup-
ply equations by including state dummy variables. Using a Newey and West
(1987) test we reject no state specific intercepts at the 1% level 26.
We first turn to the inverse demand estimation results given in Table 2.
The own quantity coeﬃcients for all loan types are negative as expected and
estimated elasticities, which are derived from these coeﬃcients, are −4.95,
−4.58, and −7.62 for real estate, commercial and industrial, and installment
loans respectively. Even though these values are relatively large, they are
smaller than what others have found (see Neven and Röller (1999)). The
reason for this is the way market heterogeneity is treated (i.e. state specific
dummy variables). More specifically, we find that the estimated elastici-
ties are much larger when geographic market heterogeneity is not controlled
for. To see this, consider parallel inverse demand curves from diﬀerent geo-
graphic markets, where only the intercept varies. If we do not account for
the varying intercept, the inverse demand curve would be estimated to be
rather flat, which results in large elasticity estimates. Larger elasticity es-
timates, in turn, raises the estimate of the conduct parameters, since there
24The modeled exogenous variables are population, income, employment, quarterly
dummies, wages, number of banks, and number of branches, and the additional instru-
ments include capital, the price of capital, the logarithm of the price of capital, labor, the
logarithm of wages, federal funds rate, treasury bill rates, and the price of money market
demand accounts.
25The model results in a χ2 statistic of 0.31, which does not reject the null hypothesis
that the over-identifying restrictions are valid at any reasonable significance level.
26The D-statistic suggested by Newey and West (1987) is a χ2s given by D =
T (q1 − q0), where where s is the number of restrictions, q1 is the value of the GMM
objective function under the restricted model and q0 is the value under the unrestricted
model. Note that the estimated covariance matrix from the unrestricted model is used
to estimate the restricted model.
11
is a one to one relationship between the estimated demand elasticity and
the estimated behavioral parameter. In sum, it appears that controlling
for market heterogeneity is important to obtain more reasonable demand
elasticity estimates.
Elasticities of supply for savings deposits are derived from the quantity
coeﬃcient in Table 3. The supply elasticity has the expected sign with a
value of 4.99. Amel and Hannan (1999) elasticity of supply estimate for
savings deposits is 0.093, where they estimate supply elasticities for local
banking markets.27 Amel and Hannan’s low elasticity estimate could be
attributed to their analysis at the local banking market level. However, Dick
(2001), who also estimates demand at the local level, uses a multinomial logit
specification and measures the elasticity of supply of 5.95.
The marginal cost parameter estimates are shown in Tables (4) and (5).
We estimate average loan marginal costs and find all are positive. Loan
marginal costs are 0.0075, 0.036, and 0.021 for real estate loans, commer-
cial and industrial loans, and installment loans at the mean, respectively.
Average marginal costs for savings deposits are estimated at 0.012.
We now turn to the behavioral parameters for the loans (θ0s) and de-
posit markets (λ) (see Table (6)). Our estimates of the θ0js are 0.059 for real
estate loans, 0.11 for commercial and industrial loans, and 0.14 for install-
ment loans. These parameters are all significantly diﬀerent from 0 at the
1% level, rejecting the hypothesis of perfect competition. We also test for
collusive behavior (θ = 1) and find that behavioral parameters in all mar-
kets are significantly diﬀerent from 1 at the 1% level. Finally, we test for
Nash behavior which is when θj = 1/N . Using the average number of banks
in our sample N = 176, we test whether θ = 0.0057.28 We find that the
conduct parameters for all loans are significantly greater than Nash conduct
between 176 banks would predict. Putting it diﬀerently, our estimated con-
duct parameter implies Nash behavior amongst 11 banks in the real estate
market, 9 banks in the commercial and industrial loan and 7 in installment
markets. Given that the average number of competitors in Federal Reserve
defined geographic markets is much lower than 176 (in urban markets the
average number of competitors (including thrifts) is 26 and in rural mar-
kets the average number is 5) our estimated behavioral parameters are more
closely in line with Nash conduct.
The larger coeﬃcient estimate of θ for commercial and industrial loans
27They also estimate supply elasticities for MMDA and NOW accounts with results of
0.194 and 0.042 respectively.
28 It is important to note that N=176 is the mean number of firms, not the actual number
of firms in each market.
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might warrant a closer analysis. Commercial and industrial loans, especially
small business (loans up to $1, 000, 000) and middle market loans (loans up
to $10, 000, 000), are of considerable interest in the antitrust analysis of DOJ
(and to some extent the Federal Reserve). This is because small businesses
typically do not travel very far to obtain credit.29 They rely on the banks
with branches close to them, because of their convenience and also because
these banks are able to obtain more information about the small business.30
It is hypothesized that this additional information allows the banks to better
judge the risk of the local small business. Hence, the propensity for market
power is larger, because competition in small business markets is more lo-
calized.31 Our results indicate that these antitrust concerns are warranted,
since the parameter estimates point to a non-competitive equilibrium.
The savings deposits conduct parameter (λ) is estimated at 0.032, which
is significantly diﬀerent from perfect competition (λ = 0) and is also sig-
nificantly larger than non-cooperative Nash behavior (λ = 1/N). In other
words, banks compete less than non-cooperative Nash behavior would sug-
gest. This is surprising since a number of financial institutions oﬀer a variety
of similar products with varying levels of return and liquidity that compete
directly with savings deposits. More importantly, many types of financial
institutions such as savings and loan associations and credit unions exist
that oﬀer the same product as commercial banks. While these financial
institutions are not included in our data, they do not seem to exert com-
petitive restraints on banks to raise deposit rates to competitive levels.32
This could be an indication that banks are providing other (unmeasured)
services to retail banking consumers, who end up “paying” for these services
with reduced savings deposit rates. Another possible explanation is the ex-
istence of switching costs. Switching costs lower the amount of consumer
mobility that would occur for a given price change. Sharpe (1997) finds that
greater population migration into a market positively aﬀects deposit rates.
He attributes this result to the existence of switching costs, since migrating
customers have no existing deposit relationship in the market.
The estimated markups and markdowns can be calculated from equa-
tions (3) and (4) as rlj − rd1 − MC(Lj/N) = θj/
µ
∂rlj
∂Lj
Lj
rlj
¶
and −rd2 + rd1 −
29Kwast, Starr-McCluer, and Wolken (1997) find that important financial services con-
sumed by small businesses are primarily provided by local institutions.
30The importance of lending relationships between banks and firms has been investigated
in several studies. See Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995)
31See Rhoades (1996) for a discussion of small business loans in antitrust analysis.
32Our results are consistent with those in Amel and Hannan (1999).
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MC(D2/N) = λ/
µ
∂rd2
∂D2
D2
rd2
¶
, respectively. As can be seen, the markups
(markdown) are a function of the elasticities and the conduct parameter. We
find markups of some 10, 29, and 18 basis points for real estate loans, com-
mercial and industrial loans, and installment loans, respectively (or 1.1%,
2.4%, and 1.8%, respectively). Estimated markdown in retail time and sav-
ings markets is 4 basis points (or 0.7%). It is important to emphasize that
these margins are kept low by the relatively large demand elasticities in each
of the markets.
Overall, we therefore find that both the deposit and the loan market
display some degree of non-competitive behavior. In particular, there is
evidence that in both markets prices are higher than a non-cooperative Nash
outcome would predict.
Given that our empirical model accounts for market imperfections on
both the input side (deposit) as well as the output side (loan) it is interesting
to compare our results to a situation where either the input or the output side
is assumed to be perfectly competitive. In other words, we like to provide
some evidence on whether it matters for the measurement of product market
imperfections that the input market is assumed to be perfect.
To do this we re-estimate our model setting λ = 0, i.e. we assume
that the input market is perfectly competitive. The results for the conduct
parameters are in Table (6). As can be seen, the estimated θ0s are virtually
unchanged, yielding 0.059, 0.11, and 0.14 for real estate loans, commercial
and industrial loans, and installment loans, respectively. Moreover, the
estimated markups are 1.4%, 2.7% and 2.1%, respectively, which is very
close to the markups implied by the results in table 6. We therefore find no
evidence that ignoring the input side matters in terms of estimating market
power in the output market. In this sense to two sides of the market are
separable.
In addition, we have re-estimated our model setting θi = 0 for all i, i.e.
we assume that the output market is perfectly competitive. The resulting
estimate of λ is 0.032 which is virtually unchanged from the estimate re-
ported for the full model in Table 6. Moreover, the implied markdown is
0.7% which is also unchanged. Consequently, we find no evidence that as-
suming that the output market is perfectly competitive has any eﬀect on the
measurement of monopsony power. In this sense to two sides of the market
are separable.
Finally, we test whether aggregation potentially aﬀects these findings.
We re-estimate our model aggregating into single loan and deposit variables.
The estimated behavioral parameters are reported in Table 6. As can be
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seen, the estimate of θ increases to 0.22 which is significantly larger than
under the disaggregate model. In other words, aggregation matters for the
estimated conduct. On the other hand, the estimate for λ is unchanged
and the markdown is 0.66%. Moreover, setting either θ = 0 or λ = 0 and
re-estimating does not aﬀect the conduct parameter estimates either. This
implies that the separability of the input and output markets holds even
under aggregation.
Overall, we find that the input side and the output side are empirically
separable, that is the measurement of market power on one side of the market
is not aﬀected by the assuming that the other side of the market is perfectly
competitive. This is true independent of whether the output market is
aggregated or not. Our results suggest that empirical studies of market
power that concentrate on either the input side or the output side, may not
be subject to a significant misspecification error.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the empirical separability of input and
output market imperfections. We specify model of banking competition and
simultaneously estimate banks conduct in output (loan) and input (deposit)
markets. We find that firms display some degree of non-competitive behavior
in both the loan and the deposit markets. In particular, there is evidence
that in both markets prices are higher than a non-cooperative Nash would
predict.
Given that our empirical model accounts for market imperfections on
both the input side (deposit) as well as the output side (loan) we then
compare our results to a situation where either the input or the output side
is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Our main result is as that the input
side and the output side are empirically separable, that is the measurement
of market power on one side of the market is not aﬀected by the assuming
that the other side of the market is perfectly competitive. This is true
independent of whether the output market is aggregated or not. Our results
suggest that empirical studies of market power that concentrate on either the
input side or the output side, are not subject to a significant misspecification
error.
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Table 1: U.S. Banking Summary Statistics
Variable State Mean Std Dev
Real Estate Loans 13076 17184
Commercial and Industrial Loans 6953 10172
Installment Loans 3829 5002
Real Estate Rate 0.090 0.014
Commercial and Industrial Rate 0.12 0.036
Installment Rate 0.10 0.018
Wage Rate 5.84 1.02
Purchased Funds 9197 13673
Savings Deposits 13780 15624
Purchased Fund Rate 0.069 0.023
Savings Deposit Rate 0.057 0.015
Number of Banks 176 174
Number of Branches 1100 1010
All dollar values are in millions of U.S. dollars, except wage rate which is in
thousands of U.S. dollars.
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Table 2: Loan Demand Estimates
T
Variable Estimate Std Err Ratio
Real Estate Loans
Constant −1.51 0.17 −8.69
Quantity −0.20 0.0023 −88.26
Population −0.066 0.014 −4.77
Income 0.0024 0.00081 2.94
Q2 −0.0084 0.0012 −7.00
Q3 −0.0037 0.0010 −3.70
Q4 0.0025 0.00093 2.70
Total Assets 0.00030 0.0059 0.05
NBR/N 0.0013 0.00028 4.67
Total Loans 0.15 0.0054 27.10
Commercial and Industrial Loans
Constant −1.15 0.13 −8.63
Quantity −0.22 0.0019 −116.68
Population −0.79 0.012 −65.57
Income −0.0082 0.00078 −10.56
Employment 0.80 0.0085 93.64
Q2 −0.0020 0.0014 −1.43
Q3 0.013 0.0011 12.40
Q4 −0.016 0.0011 −15.41
Total Assets −0.062 0.0063 −9.85
NBR/N −0.0071 0.00032 −22.49
Total Loans 0.22 0.0045 49.78
Installment Loans
Constant 5.39 0.12 46.21
Quantity −0.13 0.0012 −109.54
Population −0.34 0.011 −32.32
Income −0.0092 0.00074 −12.49
Q2 −0.011 0.0012 −9.34
Q3 −0.013 0.0010 −12.53
Q4 −0.0090 0.0011 −8.52
Employment −0.20 0.0071 −28.13
Total Assets 0.038 0.0060 6.36
NBR/N −0.006 0.00029 −20.74
Total Loans −0.019 0.0044 −4.20
State and yearly dummy variables are included in each equation, but not reported
in this table.
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Table 3: Deposit Supply Estimates
T
Variable Estimate Std Err Ratio
Constant −3.04 0.025 −121.16
Quantity 0.20 0.0021 93.58
Income −0.0098 0.00091 −10.73
Q2 −0.010 0.0013 −8.09
Q3 −0.012 0.0011 −11.92
Q4 −0.015 0.0011 −13.53
Total Assets −0.29 0.0069 −42.74
NBR/N −0.0065 0.00031 −20.95
Total Loans 0.12 0.0049 24.20
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Table 4: Marginal Cost Estimates for Loans
T
Variable Estimate Std Err Ratio
Real Estate Loans
Constant 0.066 0.0076 8.71
ln y1 0.071 0.00041 172.39
ln y2 −0.091 0.00068 −134.20
ln y3 0.004463 0.000690 6.47
NBR 0.000032 3.48E−7 92.85
lnWlab −0.025 0.0019 −13.00
lnWcap −0.023 0.0019 −11.89
Commercial and Industrial Loans
Constant 0.66 0.0062 106.44
ln y1 −0.037 0.00062 −60.50
ln y2 −0.12 0.00082 −144.81
ln y3 −0.046 0.00069 −66.49
NBR 0.000075 3.136E−7 238.02
lnWlab 0.0068 0.0019 3.58
lnWcap −0.074 0.0016 −44.98
Installment Loans
Constant 0.248 0.0026 95.40
ln y1 0.017 0.00020 82.57
ln y3 0.017 0.00027 62.53
ln y2 −0.054 0.00033 −165.61
NBR 0.000016 1.17E−7 139.07
lnWlab −0.0967 0.00092 −104.86
lnWcap −0.025 0.00059 −42.71
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Table 5: Marginal Cost Estimates for Savings Deposits
T
Variable Estimate Std Err Ratio
Constant −1.39 0.013 −111.78
lnx3 0.046 0.00093 49.75
NBR 0.000044 4.81E−7 90.60
lnWlab 0.46 0.0036 128.92
lnWcap −0.20 0.0030 −64.34
Table 6: Market Conduct Measures
T
Market Parameter Parameter Estimate Std Err Ratio
Disaggregated Model
Real Estate Loans θ1 = δ1/N¯ 0.059 0.00079 74.21
Commercial and Industrial Loans θ2 = δ2/N¯ 0.11 0.0011 102.11
Installment Loans θ3 = δ3/N¯ 0.14 0.0015 91.98
Savings Deposits λ = δ/N¯ 0.032 0.00097 33.15
Disaggregated Model with no deposits
Real Estate Loans θ1 = δ1/N¯ 0.059 0.0016 37.83
Commercial and Industrial Loans θ2 = δ2/N¯ 0.11 0.0022 50.92
Installment Loans θ3 = δ3/N¯ 0.14 0.0029 48.53
Aggregated Model
All Loans θ = δ1/N¯ 0.22 0.027 8.19
Savings Deposits λ = δ/N¯ 0.032 0.0031 10.37
We calculate behavior at mean of N, N¯ = 176.
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